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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Supreme Court Docket No. 33459, district court case number 2005-14946 
(hereinafter, 33459) and Supreme Court Docket No. 33460, district court case number 
2005-07922*C (hereinafter, 33460) have been consolidated for appellate purposes. In 
33459 and 33460, Mr. Urrabazo pleaded guilty to statutory rape and battery on a police 
officer. He received a unified sentence of ten years, with three years fixed for his 
conviction for statutory rape, and received a unified sentence of five years, with three 
years fixed, for his conviction for battery on a police officer. The district court retained 
jurisdiction twice on both offenses without ordering an intervening period of probation, 
but subsequently relinquished jurisdiction and executed the above sentences. On 
appeal, Mr. Urrabazo asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it 
relinquished jurisdiction and that the sentences in this case are excessive and therefore 
represent an abuse of the district court's discretion. 
In its Respondent's Brief, the State does not dispute the merits of Mr. Urrabazo's 
claims that the district court abused its discretion when it relinquished jurisdiction, nor 
that the district court imposed an excessive sentence in this case. Instead, the State 
asserts that the district court lacked the authority pursuant to I.C. § 19-2601(4) to place 
Mr. Urrabazo on a second period of retained jurisdiction without an intervening period of 
probation. (Respondent's Brief, pp.4-13.) The State has also asserted that 
Mr. Urrabazo's appeal should be deemed to be untimely in light of their assertion that 
the second period of retained jurisdiction in this case was not authorized by statute. 
(Respondent's Brief, pp.8-13.) 
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This Reply Brief is necessary to clarify that, under well established principles of 
statutory interpretation, I.C. § 19-2601 (4) is properly interpreted to permit the district 
court to order consecutive periods of retained jurisdiction in a case without the court 
being forced to order a period of probation. In so doing, Mr. Urrabazo, like the State, 
urges this Court to revisit the recent decision in State v. Barclay, _ Idaho _, _ 
P .3d _, 2008 WL 4646058 (Ct. App. 2008)1. 
Mr. Urrabazo contends that the district court in this case properly ordered a 
second period of retained jurisdiction in this case, which also tolled the time for 
Mr. Urrabazo's appeal, and this Court should consider the merits of Mr. Urrabazo's 
sentencing claims. Alternatively, Mr. Urrabazo asserts that, should this Court decide 
that the district court was without authority to order consecutive periods of retained 
jurisdiction without an intervening period of probation, this Court should find that it 
nevertheless has jurisdiction to consider Mr. Urrabazo's sentencing claims because 
Mr. Urrabazo was affirmatively misled by the district court's actions as to the proper time 
for filing an appeal. 
While Mr. Urrabazo continues to vigorously assert that the district court abused 
its discretion when it relinquished jurisdiction over his case and further abused its 
discretion by imposing an excessive sentence, he will rely on the arguments presented 
in his Appellant's Brief and will not reiterate those arguments herein. 
1 As of the writing of this Reply Brief, the Court's opinion in Barclay is not yet been 
released for publication in the permanent law reports and may be subject to revision or 
withdrawal. 
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Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings were previously 
articulated in Mr. Urrabazo's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply 
Brief, but are incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
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ISSUES 
1. Under the relevant principles of statutory interpretation, does I.C. § 19-2601 (4) 
authorize a district court to order consecutive periods of retained jurisdiction 
without ordering an intervening period of probation? 
2. Assuming, arguendo, that this Court finds that the district court lacked the 
authority under I.C. 19-2601(4) to order consecutive periods of retained 
jurisdiction without an intervening period of probation, should this Court consider 
Mr. Urrabazo's sentencing claims because he was affirmatively mislead as to the 
time for filing his appeal by the district court's actions? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
Under The Relevant Principles Of Statutorv Interpretation, I.C. § 19-2601 (4) Authorizes 
A District Court To Order Consecutive Periods Of Retained Jurisdiction Without 
Ordering An Intervening Period Of Probation 
A. Introduction 
Idaho Code § 19-2601(4) provides, inter alia, that the district court, "in its 
discretion may sentence a defendant to more than one (1) period of retained jurisdiction 
after a defendant has been placed on probation in a case." The State asserts that the 
italicized portion of this provision deprives a district court of authority to order a second 
period of retained jurisdiction without an intervening period of probation. However, this 
language is ambiguous as to whether there exists an absolute prohibition against the 
district court ordering a second period of retained jurisdiction immediately following the 
first. 
Regardless of whether the provisions of I.C. § 19-2601(4) at issue in this appeal 
are deemed ambiguous by this Court, the interpretation urged by the State is contrary to 
the express purpose of this bill, and represents an unreasonable limitation on the 
changes that the relevant amendments to I.C. § 19-2601(4) were intended to effectuate. 
Finally, adopting the State's interpretation, that there must be an intervening order of 
probation prior to the district court ordering a second period of retained jurisdiction, 
would result in the absurd consequence of forcing district courts to order probation for a 
nominal period of time in order to be able to acquire further sentencing information 
through a second period of retained jurisdiction. 
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B. Standard Of Review 
The proper interpretation of a statute is a question of law that this Court reviews 
de novo. State v. Stover, 140 Idaho 927,929,104 P.3d 969, 971 (2005). 
C. Permitting The District Court To Order More Than One Period Of Retained 
Jurisdiction Without An Intervening Period Of Probation Is Consistent With The 
Expressly Stated Intent Of The Legislature When It Amended I.C. § 19-2601 To 
Permit More Than One Period Of Retained Jurisdiction And Further Avoids An 
Interpretation That Would Lead To Absurd Results 
1. General Principles Of Statutory Interpretation 
"The objective of statutory interpretation is to give effect to legislative intent." 
State v. Yzaguirre, 144 Idaho 471, 475, 163 P.3d 1183, 1187 (2007). In fact, "[w]hen 
interpreting a statute, 'the court's only concern is to ascertain and give effect to the 
legislative intent as expressed, irrespective of the wisdom, practicability, policy, 
expediency or possible results.'" State v. Kimball, 145 Idaho 542, 544, 181 P.3d 468, 
470 (2008) (quoting State v. Bever, 118 Idaho 80,81,794 P.2d 1136, 1137 (1990» 
(emphasis added). Statutory interpretation begins with an examination of the statute 
itself, because the literal words of the statute are generally deemed to be the best guide 
to legislative intent. Yzaguirre, 144 Idaho at 475, 163 P.3d at 1187. 
However, even the plain meaning of the statute will not prevail if it is contrary to 
the clearly expressed intent of the legislature or if the plain meaning leads to absurd 
results. Kimball, 145 Idaho at 544, 181 P.3d at 471; Yzaguirre, 144 Idaho at 475,163 
P.3d at 1187; Garza v. State, 139 Idaho 533, 536, 82 P.3d 445, 448 (2003). 
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2. The Language Of I.C. § 19-2601(4) Is Ambiguous As To Whether The 
District Court Must First Place A Defendant On Probation Before Ordering 
A Second Period Of Retained Jurisdiction 
This Court generally will not engage in statutory construction unless the statute 
being interpreted is ambiguous. See KimbaJl, 145 Idaho at 544, 181 P.3d at 471. "If the 
language of the statute is capable of more than one reasonable construction it is 
ambiguous." Yzaguirre, 144 Idaho at 475, 163 P.3d at 1187. When a statute is 
ambiguous, this Court may construe the statute in light of the language used, the 
reasonableness of the proposed interpretations, and the policy behind the statute. 
KimbaJl, 145 Idaho at 544,181 P.3d at 471. 
As has been noted, the central dispute in this case regarding the interpretation of 
I.C. § 19-2601(4) deals with the phrase, "after the defendant has been placed on 
probation." However, when the entire statute is read as whole, this language is not 
limiting and does not purport to restrict the district court's authority outside of that 
particular circumstance. Instead, it appears to use this phrase to delineate one of the 
circumstances in which such an exercise of discretion on the part of the district court to 
order a second period of retained jurisdiction would likely arise. Indeed, the very fact 
that the district court in this case read the provisions of I.C. § 19-2601(4) as permitting 
him to order a second period of retained jurisdiction demonstrates the reasonableness 
of this interpretation. (33459 R., pp.91-92.) 
Moreover, even if this Court were to find that the relevant language of I.C. § 19-
2601(4) is not ambiguous, the Idaho Supreme Court in Stover has already determined 
that legislative history may nevertheless be consulted in order to determine the 
legislative intent of a statute. Stover, 140 Idaho at 931-932,104 P.3d at 973-974. 
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3. Interpreting The Provisions Of I.C. 19-2601(4) To Only Permit A Second 
Period Of Retained Jurisdiction If There Is An Intervening Period Of 
Probation Is Contrary To The Expressed Intent OfThe Legislature When It 
Amended I.C. 19-2601 To Allow For More Than One Period Of Retained 
Jurisdiction; And This Interpretation Would Further Lead To Absurd 
Results 
In 1998, the Idaho State Legislature amended the provisions of I.C. § 19-2601(4) 
to permit a district court to order more than one period of retained jurisdiction in a case. 
(Appendix A.) Prior to the 1998 amendments, district courts were only authorized to 
order one period of retained jurisdiction, and one period only. See, e.g., State v. Travis, 
125 Idaho 1,6-7, 867 P.2d 234, 239-240 (1994). Specifically, the following language 
was added to I.C. § 19-2601(4): "The court in its discretion may sentence a defendant 
to more than one (1) period of retained jurisdiction after a defendant has been placed on 
probation in a case." (Appendix A.) 
The State asks this Court to find that the above italicized portion of I.C. § 19-
2601(4) does not authorize, and further deprives the district court of subject matter 
jurisdiction to order, consecutive periods of retained jurisdiction if the defendant is not 
placed on an intervening period of probation. (Respondent's Brief, pp.5-11.) 
Mr. Urrabazo asserts that it would be contrary to the clear and express purpose 
of the legislature in amending I.C. § 19-2601(4) if this Court were to limit the district 
court's authority to order a second period of retained jurisdiction to only those cases 
where the defendant has served an intervening period of probation. Fortunately, this 
Court has extensive evidence from which to determine the legislative intent of the 
relevant amendments made to I.C. § 19-2601. And all of the evidence of the intent of 
the legislature shows that it would be contrary to the express purpose of providing the 
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district courts with flexibility in sentencing for this Court to adopt the interpretation of 
I.C. § 19-2601 (4) that the State is urging. 
In an attempt to discern the intent of the legislature, this Court "may seek 
edification from the statute's legislative history and contemporaneous context at 
enactment." State v. Burnight, 132 Idaho 654, 659, 978 P.2d 214, 219 (1999). The 
legislative statement of purpose for the 1998 amendments to I.C. § 19-2601(4), which 
provided that district courts may order more than one period of retained jurisdiction, 
reads as follows: 
STATEMENT OF PURPOSE 
This bill is one of a series of bills that the Justices of the Supreme Court 
transmitted to the Governor in their annual "defects in the laws", report 
under Art. 5, Sec. 25 of the Idaho Constitution 
Section 19-2601, Idaho Code, provides that a court may retain jurisdiction 
over a defendant sentenced to the State Board of Correction for a period 
of 180 days and may, if appropriate, suspend the remainder of the 
sentence and place the defendant on probation. 
This bill, if enacted, will clarify that a court may sentence a defendant to 
more than one period of retained jurisdiction in a case thereby giving the 
judge added flexibility in fashioning an appropriate sentence. 
(Appendix A.) 
There are two things of note in the Statement of Purpose provided by the 
legislature in support of the 1998 amendments to I.C. § 19-2601(4): first, the bill was 
predicated on the recommendations made by the Idaho Supreme Court and was 
intended to effectuate those recommendations; and, second, that there is no language 
suggesting an intent to limit the district court's power to order more than one period of 
retained jurisdiction to only that limited class of cases where the defendant had served a 
period of probation between periods of retained jurisdiction. In fact, the above-quoted 
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language demonstrates the opposite intention - to maximize the flexibility provided to a 
district court in acquiring the necessary information in order to determine whether a 
defendant is a suitable candidate for probation. (Appendix A.) 
The substance of the Idaho Supreme Court's recommendations in it's 1997 
Defects in the Laws Letter to the Governor, which is referenced as the basis for the 
1998 amendments to I.C. 19-2601(4) in the Statement of Purpose for these 
amendments, was provided to the Senate Judiciary and Rules Committee as part of the 
committee's agenda for the January 19, 1998 meeting where these amendments were 
discussed. (Appendix B.) The agenda itself reflects that the proposed change to 
I.C. § 19-2601 was simply, "to provide that a court may sentence a defendant to more 
than one period of retained jurisdiction in a case." (Appendix B.) 
In the Defects in the Laws Letter, the Idaho Supreme Court's recommendation 
was the following: 
1. Consider amending I.C. § 19-2601 relating to sentencing options 
in a criminal case to clarify that a district court judge may retain 
jurisdiction over a defendant even though the defendant has been 
the subject of a retained jurisdiction program on a previous 
occasion. 
The proposed amendments to 19-2601 will create additional alternatives 
in the sentencing of defendants and will give the judge more flexibility in 
fashioning an appropriate sentence by permitting the judge to sentence a 
defendant to more than one period of retained jurisdiction. 
(Appendix B.) 
Nothing in this recommendation limits the intended alteration in the law to only 
those cases where a defendant had served an intervening period of probation, nor does 
the Idaho Supreme Court's letter in any way reference the prior decision in Travis as the 
basis for the proposed change. (Appendix B.) 
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The minutes from the January 19, 1998 Senate Judiciary and Rules Committee 
Meeting, where the Idaho Supreme Court's proposed changes were considered, reflect 
that the committee approved these suggested changes to the rules without any 
objection and further recommended that the suggested changes "go into effect as 
provided by law." (Appendix B.) On January 30, 1998, the Senate Judiciary and Rules 
Committee sent the proposed amendment to the Senate floor with a "do pass" 
recommendation. (Appendix C.) 
Likewise, the minutes of the House Judiciary, Rules and Administration 
Committee meeting on March 9, 1998 reflect that the 1998 amendments to I.C. § 19-
2601(4) were meant to effectuate the changes recommended in the Defects in the Laws 
Letter, and that the suggested amendments would clarify "that a court may sentence a 
defendant to more than one period of retained jurisdiction in a case, thereby giving the 
judge added flexibility in fashioning an appropriate sentence." (Appendix D.) As with 
the Senate, the House committee passed the proposed legislation to the House floor 
with a "do pass" recommendation. (Appendix D.) The amendments to I.C. § 19-
2601(4) were subsequently approved by the Idaho State Legislature on March 18, 1998. 
(Appendix E.) 
The State asserts that, "it is clear that the legislature did not intend to give 
sentencing courts authority to order immediately successive periods of retained 
jurisdiction without an intervening period of probation." (Respondent's Brief, p.7.) But 
the State's assertion is not supported by citation to any of the available resources that 
clearly articulated the legislative intent in amending I.C. § 19-2601(4) to permit more 
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than one period of retained jurisdiction. The sole support for this assertion is the 
ambiguous language of the statute itself. (Respondent's Brief, p.7.) 
An examination of the relevant legislative history demonstrates that the 1998 
amendments to I.C. § 19-2601(4), which provided for the district court to order more 
than one period of retained jurisdiction in a case, were intended to provide exactly the 
type of flexibility and informed decision-making in sentencing that the State now argues 
should be prohibited. All of the statements indicating the legislative purpose focus on 
providing flexibility for the district court, rather than unduly limiting the court's ability to 
acquire necessary information for sentencing. 
The Court of Appeals in Barclay determined that the 1998 legislative 
amendments to I.C. § 1902601, which authorized more than one period of retained 
jurisdiction, were "added apparently in response to the Idaho Supreme Court's decision 
in State v. Travis, 125 Idaho 1, 867 P.2d 234 (1994)." Barclay, 2008 WL at *2 
(emphasis added). The defendant in Travis was placed on probation after his initial 
period of retained jurisdiction. Travis, 125 Idaho at 2, 867 P.2d at 235. After his 
probation was revoked, the district court in Travis ordered a second period of retained 
jurisdiction. Id. at 3,867 P.2d at 236. Because, at that time, I.C. § 19-2601(4) did not 
authorize more than one period of retained jurisdiction, the Travis Court held that the 
district court exceeded its authority under the statute when it retained jurisdiction a 
second time. Id. at 7, 867 P.2d at 240. 
The Barclay Opinion concluded that the amendments to I.C. § 19-2601(4) were 
intended to address the limited factual scenario presented in Travis without any citation 
to the legislative history that would support this assertion. Barclay, 2008 WL at *2. A 
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review of the Statement of Purpose for the relevant amendments to I.C. § 19-2601(4), 
along with additional evidence of the legislative history for the changes adopted by the 
legislature in 1998, reveals this assumed basis to be erroneous. Mr. Urrabazo asserts 
that, under a proper review of the legislature's own statement of purpose, and the 
legislative history for this enactment, the intent of the legislature was not limited to the 
factual situation presented in Travis. (Appendixes A-D.) Indeed, the Travis decision is 
not mentioned a single time in any of the committee meetings prior to the adoption of 
the 1998 amendments to I.C. § 19-2601(4), nor is it mentioned in the Defects in the 
Laws Letter that formed the basis of this legislation. (Appendixes A-D.) 
In addition to being directly contrary to the express legislative intent, the 
interpretation of I.C. § 19-2601(4) advocated by the State would further lead to absurd 
results. "The primary purpose of the retained jurisdiction program is to enable the trial 
court to gain additional information regarding the defendant's rehabilitative potential and 
suitability for probation." State v. Lutes, 141 Idaho 911, 915, 120 P.3d 299, 303 
(Ct. App. 2005). In cases where the district court believed that it required additional 
information regarding the defendant's suitability for probation following an initial period 
of retained jurisdiction, the State's interpretation would force the district court to order a 
defendant to be placed on probation, and then seek a stipulation for the probation to be 
revoked, in order to get all of the necessary information for an informed sentencing 
decision. This is clearly an absurd result, particularly in view of the strong public policy 
favoring informed decisions by the district court with regard to sentencing. 
The legislative intent of the relevant 1998 amendments to I.C. § 19-2601(4) was 
to maximize the flexibility of the district court's options at sentencing and to permit more 
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than one period of retained jurisdiction to be ordered without limitation. Adoption of the 
interpretation of I.C. § 19-2601 (4) urged by the State would be contrary to this purpose 
because it would place undue restrictions on the district court's power to acquire 
necessary information about a defendant's suitability for probation to only those cases 
where a defendant had already been placed on probation. This type of limitation was 
never intended by the legislature. As such, this Court should interpret I.C. § 19-2601(4) 
to permit a district court to order more than one period of retained jurisdiction even if the 
district court has not ordered an interim period of probation. 
II. 
Assuming, Arguendo, That This Court Finds That The District Court Lacked The 
Authority Under I.C. 19-2601(4) To Order Consecutive Periods Of Retained Jurisdiction 
Without An Intervening Period Of Probation, This Court Should Consider Mr. Urrabazo's 
SentenCing Claims Because He Was Affirmatively Mislead As To The Time For Filing 
His Appeal By The District Court's Actions 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Urrabazo relied on the district court's actions in placing him on a second 
period of retained jurisdiction in delaying the filing of his Notice of Appeal. Additionally, 
prior Idaho Supreme Court cases have reached the merits of underlying sentencing 
decisions even when the district court was found to have acted outside the scope of 
what is authorized under I.C. § 19-2601 (4). In light of this, this Court still has jurisdiction 
to consider Mr. Urrabazo's sentencing claims 
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B. This Court Should Consider Mr. Urrabazo's Sentencing Claims Because He Was 
Affirmatively Mislead As To The Time For Filing His Appeal By The District 
Court's Actions 
Idaho courts have repeatedly recognized that, when a defendant or his counsel is 
affirmatively misled by some governmental authority as to the tirne for filing a late filing 
does not deprive the court of jurisdiction. See, e.g., State v. Corder, 115 Idaho 1137, 
1140, 772 P.2d 1231, 1234 (Ct. App. 1989). And the United States Supreme Court has 
also recognized that special circumstances may arise that would excuse an otherwise 
untimely filing of an appeal. See Fallen v. U.S., 378 U.S. 139, 142-143 (1964) 
(superceded by statute as stated in Carlisle v. U.S., 517 U.S. 416, 424-425 (1996». 
The Idaho Supreme Court has previously held that the time for filing an appeal 
was not tolled or enlarged by the district court ordering an unauthorized period of 
retained jurisdiction under I.C. § 19-2601 (4). State v. Ferguson, 130 Idaho 160, 160-
161, 938 P.2d 187, 187-188 (1997). However, the Court's holding in Ferguson is 
largely premised on the fact that established case law at that time made clear that the 
district court was without authority to order the second period of probation, and 
therefore reliance on this order was unreasonable. Id. at 161, 938 P.2d at 188. 
Ferguson was decided in 1997, prior to the amendments to I.C. § 19-2601(4) which 
permit the district court to order more than one period of retained jurisdiction in a case. 
Unlike the defendant in Ferguson, neither the district court nor Mr. Urrabazo had any 
subsequent case law suggesting whether an intervening period of probation was 
mandatory. Therefore, it was entirely reasonable in this case that Mr. Urrabazo relied 
on the actions of the district court in delaying his filing of a notice of appeal until the 
district court entered its order following his second period of retained jurisdiction. 
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In this case, Mr. Urrabazo timely appealed from the district court's Order 
Relinquishing Jurisdiction Re: Retained Jurisdiction. (33459 R., pp.91, 96.) 
Mr. Urrabazo did not earlier file a notice of appeal in reliance on the district court's order 
placing him on a second period of retained jurisdiction. (33459 R., pp.89-90.) Because 
all parties below appear to have believed that the district court's actions were within the 
scope of I.C. § 19-2601(4), Mr. Urrabazo justifiably believed that the time for filing his 
appeal was enlarged by the second time that the district court retained jurisdiction over 
his case. See I.A.R. 14(a) (time for appeal is tolled by the length of time the district 
court actually retains jurisdiction in a case). Regardless of whether the district court 
exceeded its statutory authority in this case, Mr. Urrabazo timely filed a notice of appeal 
from the district court's order relinquishing jurisdiction after his second rider. He should 
not now be deprived of access to courts due to the actions of the district court which 
misled Mr. Urrabazo with regard to the timeliness of his appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Urrabazo respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's order 
relinquishing jurisdiction and enter an order placing Mr. Urrabazo on probation. 
Altematively, he respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it deems 
appropriate. 
DATED this 16th day of January, 2009. 
SARAH E. TOM K 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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CRIMINAL LAW--SENTENCING 
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Page 1 
AN ACT RELATING TO CRIMINAL SENTENCING; AMENDING SECTION 19-2601, IDAHO CODE, 
TO PROVIDE THAT A COURT MAY SENTENCE A DEFENDANT TO MORE THAN ONE PERIOD OF RE-
TAINED JURISDICTION IN A CASE. 
Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Idaho: 
SECTION 1. That Section 19-2601, Idaho Code, be, and the same is hereby amended 
to read as follows: 
« ID ST § 19-2601 » 
19-2601. COMMUTATION, SUSPENSION, WITHHOLDING OF SENTENCE --PROBATION. Whenever 
any person shall have been convicted, or enter a plea of guilty, in any district 
court of the state of Idaho, of or to any crime against the laws of the state, ex-
cept those of treason or murder, the court in its discretion, may: 
1. Commute the sentence and confine the defendant in the county jail, or, if the 
defendant is of proper age, in the state juvenile corrections center; or 
2. Suspend the execution of the judgment at the time of judgment or at any time 
during the term of a sentence in the county jail and place the defendant· on proba-
tion under such terms and conditions as it deems necessary and expedient; or 
3. withhold judgment on such terms and for such time as it may prescribe and may 
place the defendant on probation; or 
4. Suspend the execution of the judgment at any time during the first one hun-
dred eighty (180) days of a sentence to the custody of the state board of correc-
tion. The court shall retain jurisdiction over the prisoner for the first one 
hundred eighty (lBO) days or, if the prisoner is a juvenile, until the juvenile 
reaches twenty-one (21) years of age. The prisoner will remain committed to the 
Copr. © West 200B No Claim to Orig. Govt. Works 
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board of correction if not affirmatively placed on probation by the court. Place-
ment on probation shall be under such terms and conditions as the court deems ne-
cessary,and expedient. «+The court in its discretion may sentence a defendant to 
more than one (1) period of retained jurisdiction after a defendant has been 
placed on probation in a case.+» In no case shall the board of correction or its 
agent, the department of correction, be required to hold a hearing of any kind 
with respect to a recommendation to the court for the grant or denial of proba-
tion. Probation is a matter left to the sound discretion of the court. Any re-
commendation made by the department to the court regarding the prisoner shall be 
in the nature of an addendum to the presentence report. The board of correction 
and its agency, the department of correction, and their employees shall not be 
held financially responsible for damages, injunctive or declaratory relief for any 
recommendation made to the district court under this section. 
5. If the crime involved is a felony and if judgment is withheld as provided in 
subsection 3. of this section or if judgment and a sentence of custody to the 
state board of correction is suspended at the time of judgment in accordance with 
subsection 2. of this section or as provided by subsection 4. of this section and 
the court shall place the defendant upon probation, it shall be to the board of 
correction or any other person or persons the court, in its discretion l deems ap-
propriate. 
6. If the crime involved is a misdemeanor, indictable or otherwise I or if the 
court should suspend any remaining portion of a jail sentence already commuted in 
accordance with subsection 1. of this section, the court, if it grants probation, 
may place the defendant on probation. 
7. The period of probation ordered by a court under this section under a convic-
tion or plea of guilty for a misdemeanor, indictable or otherwise, may be for a 
period of not more than two (2) years; and under a conviction or plea of guilty 
for a felony the period of probation may be for a period of not more than the max-
imum period for which the defendant might have been imprisoned. 
Approved on the 18th day of March, 1998, at 4:22 p.m. o'clock. 
Effective: July 1, 1998. 
STATEMENT OF PURPOSE 
RS07487 
This bill is one of a series of bills that the Justices of the Supreme Court 
transmitted to the Governor in· their annual "defect:s in the laws', report under 
Art. 5, Sec. 25 of the Idaho Constitution. 
Section 19-2601, Idaho Code, provides that a court may retain jurisdiction over 
a defendant sentenced to the State Board of Correction for a period of 180 days 
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and may, if appropriate, suspend the remainder of the sentence and place the de-
fendant on probation. 
This bill, if enacted, will clarify that a court may sentence a defendant to 
more than one period of retained jurisdiction in a case thereby giving the judge 
added flexibility in fashioning an appropriate sentence. 
FISCAL NOTE 
The impact of this bill on state or local funds will be negligible and may res-
ult in a slight cost savings in state prison costs. 
Contact Person: Patricia Tobias Administrative Director of the Courts Idaho Su-
preme Court (208) 334-2246 
ID LEGIS 67 (1998) 
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BILL NO. 
RS 07487 
RS 07488 
RS 07489 
RS 07490 
RS 07491 
RS 07492 
RS 07493 
RS 07494 
RS 07495 
I RS 07496 
I 
AGENDA 
SENATE JUDICIARY AND RULES COMMITTEE 
1:30 p.m. 
Room 437 
Monday, January 19,1998 
DESCRIPTION 
Relating to Criminal Sentences; to provide that a court may 
sentence a defendant to more than one period of retained 
jurisdiction in a case. 
SPONSOR 
Idaho Supreme 
Court 
Relating to Judgments; to delete an obsolete reference to Idaho Supreme 
a judgment book. Court 
Relating to the Juvenile Corrections Act; to provide for the 
adjudication of offenses pertaining to the use or being under 
the influence of controlled substances under the Juvenile 
Corrections Act. 
Relating to Driving Under the Influence; to provide that it shall 
be unlawful for a person with an alcohol concentration of 0.04 
or higher but less than 0.08 to drive a commercial vehicle. 
Relating to Jury Commissions; to provide that a jury 
commissioner whose term has expired shall serve until a 
successor is appOinted and qualifies. 
Idaho Supreme 
Court 
Idaho Supreme 
Court 
Idaho Supreme 
Court 
Relating to Criminal Procedure; to clarify the procedure for the Idaho Supreme 
examination and processing of criminal complaints lodged by Court 
private citizens and make It consistent with current Idaho 
Criminal Rules and case law covering the filing of criminal 
actions. 
Relating to Public Defenders; to provide that the administrative Idaho Supreme 
judge of the county's judicial district or his designee shall Court 
appoint the committee of lawyers who are to designate the 
panel from which the public defender or juvenile public 
defender shall be chosen. 
Relating to Attachments and Garnishments; to clarify and 
enumerate the exemptions to which a debtor may be entitled 
and to make technical corrections. 
Relating to a noncustodial parent's access to a child's records; 
to provide that a minor child's address shall be deleted from 
the child's medical, dental, health, school or educational 
records upon the written request of the custodial parent. 
Idaho Supreme 
Court 
Idaho Supreme 
Court 
Relating to Idaho Statewide Trial Court Automated Records Idaho Supreme 
System (ISTARS) Technology Fund and ISTARS fee levied on Court 
certain civil cases to provide revenue for the fund. 
Minutes 
SENATE JUDICIAR:V.ANIl' RlJLES COMMITTEE 
DATE: January 19, 1997 
TIME: 1 :35 p.m. 
PLACE: 
PRESENT: 
ABSENTI 
EXCUSED: 
MINUTES: 
MOTION 
TO 
CONFIRM: 
RULES 
APPROVAL 
MOTION: 
RS 07487: 
RS 07488: 
RS 07489: 
RS 07490: 
RS 07491: 
RS 07492: 
. ",", . 
Chairman Darrington,SenatorsBoatright, Sorensen, Bunderson, Risch, King, Deide, 
Riggs, and Dunklin • ,,~ .'. . . 
,:) .. 
None 
Senator King moved that the minutes of Friday, January 16, 1998,' be approved as 
written. The motion was'secblided by Senator Sorenson and approved by voice vote. 
". -., ..... " 'J'. ,;(·.iC~ '{" ,,-, 
APPOINTMENT TO COMMISSION OF PARPONS AND PAROLE 
Janie Dressen, from St. Maries, Idaho, has been appointed to the Idaho Commission of 
Pardons and Parole by the Board of Corrections. Senator Boatright moved that the 
Committee recommend that theSeliate confirm Janie Dressen to the Commission of 
Pardons and'Parole. The motion was seconded by Senator Sorensen and approved by 
V()iCe vote. . 
COMMISSION OF PARDONS AND PAROLE (IPAPA 50) Docket No. 50-0101-9601 
and Docket No. 50-0101-9602. Senator Boatright moved that the Committee approve 
the pending rules without objection, that no further action be recommended, and that the 
rules go into effect as provided by law. The motion was seconded by Senator King and 
approved by voice vote. 
Relating to Criminal Sentences; to provide that a Court may sentence a defendant to 
morethan one period of retained jurisdiction in a case. 
Relating to Judgments; to delete an obsolete reference to a judgment book. 
Relating to the Juvenile Corrections Act; to provide for the adjudication of offenses 
pertaining to the use or being under the influence of controlled substances under the 
Juvenile Corrections Act. 
Relating to Driving Under the Influence; to provide that it shall be unlawful for a person 
with an alcohol concentration of 0.04 or higher but less than 0.08 to drive a commercial 
vehicle. 
Relating to Jury Commissions; to provide that a jury comm'issioner whose term has 
expired shall serve until a successor Is appointed and qualifies. 
Relating to Criminal Procedure; to clarify the procedure for the examination and 
processing of criminal complaints lodged by private citizens, and. make it consistent 
with current Idaho Criminal Rules and case law coverlng'the filing of criminal actions. 

,~ .f;'.. 
~,".j \::i 
ltNDA- C6'FIPLE': t~'dl:iT" . 
CHIEF JUSTicE 
The Honorable Philip E. Batt 
THE .. STATEOF IDAHO 
.·.··StJIOREMB·.COURT. 
. December 11, 1997 
-" '. ' - :'., 
Governor of the State of Idaho . . ....... . 
Second Floor ,'Statell()Ils.~llf::;·~rl&i::f;;kfil:t~~fli'ih! T.te:S 'i U"5""::'i:, 
StatehouseMaili;fi';i\{A';,;)~fj;~;r",:',l\'5ii},:i 
Re: 1997 Defects in the Laws Letter 
Dear Governor Batt: 
';-,- , .. 
SUPREME COURT BUILDING 
P.O. Box 83720 
BoISE. IDAHO 83720-0101 
In conformity withArticleV;§25'of the.Constitution ofthe StateofIdaho, this letter is being 
submitted to you on behalfof)the::JUstiC:s 6fthe'Suptetrie'Courti to report such defects and 
omissions in the Idaho Con:sti~ti6ri\aHd,t~WS'WhiChthe Court haitfourtd to exist during 1997, 
for. yout ttansftllttal' to\thele~islafutIA·)Trus:a6cume"ti(a.rsoicoHta.iriire'comfuendedamendments 
to the Idaho' StateWideTtialCdl1rt'AtltdrltaiMRecords; System (iSTARS) legislation enacted by 
the legislature in 1997, and a recommendationforthe creationofaprobation supervision fee to 
contribute tothe costs of c()untY;Ptbba!ikn"prbgt~i#s/,::"::: .' 
:. .-' ,,'::~''- l ,,' "':":i::'~',;;: ~:~A:;t:~:tj;t_:,;~~~~~)~:k~/:,,~:,:~~(}'~',~'~:,~,:~:~~t.:,:,::;~,t':~!':\'i;i::~;~~>;~"~yyl;~:.,;.'.·:-, , .) , . 'i' . 
The f611bwihg'ifati:6titlih'6;orsa~g~~tetlh~gTslaHbii'base(f:61\ ih~ t:6lirt'sohservations or as 
reported to the Court by.the trial bench, followedby. an explanation of the changes which the 
Court or individuill judges feel'at~ needed:" . I,,:.': 
.' '-; .. . :,:-' .. ,:~". ,(,:,:}~,,:>-tJ:!,C J - -'~"-:::';;,_.'-
1. Consideramendingl:C:l§''l§:260j\fiilutlhg' tOsefi~encrng: options in'a. criminal" case to 
chtrlfytlint a' di~triCdiidge iliay feHUn jur!sdiilt!on'o\lera defehdailteven though the 
defendant has been the subject of a retained jurisdiction program on a previous 
occasion. 
Thepropos'eda~e~dirterItS to'19"~'gOPwilrcreatlWadl'tibt\~laltemative~ in the sentencing of 
defendants arid will give the judge more flexibility in fashioning an appropriate sentence by 
permitting the judge to sentence a deff7ndant to rn9re than one period of retained jurisdiction. 
i~ 
\. ,.,,) c 
Hon. Philip E. Batt 
December 11, 1997 
Page 2 
2. CO,nsidet>amendingJ.C.,§)O·111,O;,relating.t6 cQurtjudgmentsand liens to eliminate 
reference to a "judgment b,ook," " ' 
".\'.;':;', "/ 
ldahoCode §JOclI IO.refers.to ~judgJllent p09k,w,hicllis no Jonger used in the present judicial 
record-keeping system. It is therefore recoiiunended that this obsolete reference be eliminated 
from the statute to avoid confusion . 
. :c<,~' . "' .. -.; ~;l.,'_~:\ '\<:t·!':;'A:idf.~,tl'.f:d{!,n;:::i~: ":'-,,' :,-, ,', 
3. Consider amending I.C.§ 18.1502C~lid I.C.§ 20·505to eliminate a conflict relating to 
the prosecution of a minot; using ()r,.under theJlifluence of a controlled substance. 
There is a conflict between LC.!§18~1502Cofthe criminal code and I.e. § 20-506 of the 
Juvenile Corrections Act. 
u: 
Under I.C. § 18-1502C a minor who uses or is under the influence of a controlled substance 
shall be prosecuted and penalized as a juvenile under the Juvenile Corrections Act unless the 
court finds that adjudication,under, the)\IyeniJeCorrectionsAct is, not appropriate. This 
section, goes,onJo,pr()y~d~;full,t~xep, !ho,ughthe .wiP-()f:is,adjudicated under the Juvenile 
Corrections Act, the minor is nevertheless sentenced as though the minor had been found 
guilty of violating themisdemeanotprovisions one. § 18-1502C. 
On.the other hand, LY,§.20c506(6)9(theJJ1,veni!e:Corrections Actprovides that the Juvenile 
Correction Act does notapplYJoI.9 .. §J8·1,502C.off~ns~sil.mless the juvenile court finds that 
prosecution of such offenses under the ,Juvenile: Corrections Act i.§appropriate. 
Thus the criminal code gives a preference for handling the offense under the Juvenile 
CotrectionsA,ct, w.hile.the)\lY~l1ile,qo#¢p~ol1s, A.ct~tat~s"thatthese, offenses should not be 
handled, \lnde~ the.'JuY¢l1ile~9t1~g901fs.A,Gt\lfi)e~s.:ther~js ;lspecific finding that it is 
appropriate. Neither.statute giyesdirection as to the preferred procedure for handling these 
offenses. . 
It is recommended thatthe.all'!biguitycanhe eliminated by amending I.e. § 20-506(6) to 
remove language. which, provides that the Juvenile Corrections Act does not apply to 
I.C. § 18-1502C offenses. ' 
. "! ; : ~; j' ." 
Han, Phiiip 13, Ba.tt 
December 11, 1991 
Page 3 
tii addition; judgeshavep6intedraUt'th~t0When: art:offertse described in I.e. § 18" 1502C is 
adjudicated under the Juvenile Corrections Act, the minor should be sentenced according to 
the provisions of the Juvertile Cortections'Act, ratherthan I.C. § IS-1502e. While this falls 
outside Of lii:lefect, we(\Vante&t'8:15f\frg-toybur"arl~htioiftheir\Views on this issue. 
4. Consider amending I.C. §1t.S004(1)(b) regarding thealtohol concentration limits for 
operatorsofa commerdillvehichHoidefine the t'ange in terms oL04 but less than .OS. 
;··H:::::,:,:,;{ .. ''',''" " ',-, ('t;:i ,;:,;;:.:-~.',:."j~ 
I.e. §18-S004(1)(b) arid (c) pr~s~tfbingthe a199holconcentration limits of operators of 
commercial vehicles, currently specifY a range of "0.04 through 0.07" and ".08 or higher." 
Thereisah isslleas to Whether an alcohol concentl'ation between 0.070 and 0.080 is covered 
by either subsection. T11isambiguity .can be eliminated 'byamending subsection (I )(b) to 
specifY arartgeof 0;04 but "less than 0.08." 
5. Consider amending I.C. § 2;.205 to provide thatjhe term of a jury commissioner is two 
. (2) yeat's orundl' hlsthel.'iSucc'esS(jfiis,ltpp?int~d :and·qualified. 
t,. ~ ,.;. '-, "0 ·i';ri),:·:t~.-"r~?t.:~;;':i:;ji~i/t~i:'it~~:;.~;t~~J~1Y{i:<~ . . 
I.e. § 2-205 relating tojl.lryc6tnhrissi~ners does liot have a standard provision for a holdover 
term of office when a successor has not been appointed at the time the completion of the 
presentcorniriissloner's'tertn'ofoffice;::Addirig a proviso to the statute tha! the incumbent's 
teriri' d:hitiriUes\iriti!· a succesS6t:·is"appoilitedi and qualifies:! will remedy any' issues created 
When a teririof offieeertds 'w'ithouta'sudcessor having been appointed. 
( , .. 
6. Consider amending IdahO Code § 19-504 to:eJlminate tlie requirement thata.magistrate 
must examine a person' Wh(Ffiies: a citizen's complaint under oath before taking 
appropriate action In regard to the complaint. 
. Private persons whodesirea'criminal prosecuiion against other ,individuals may file criminal 
complamtS'contairiing factu!tFallega'tid~,twhich, ievertiftrub;,would not amount toa criminal 
offense under any version of thefaCts'al1eged .. The present1aw, \vhich was drafted in the last 
century, requires tha(wh~n'a·persoi\makesacomplait1t, the magistrate must examine the 
complainant under oath before taking.whatever appropriate. action is indicated under the law. 
It is recorhmended thatidahoCode§19c504be amended to eliminate this requirement. 
Hon. Philip E. Batt 
December 11, 1997 
Page 4 
7. Consider,arnendilig IdaboCode§19~860relating to tbeappoilitment of a county public 
defender by boards ofcounty:~contmlssioners,' to, change from "senior judge" to 
"administrative judge or designee" as the person to appoint a committee of lawyers to 
review public defeDder'ealldidates'for,riomiliationto the county commissioners . 
. "., .... 
. "., 
The office of "seniorjudge'tha.;rheeti, replaced, by ail '~adi11.inistrative judge" who, under 
present statutes, carries Quttheadnii.nisttativeresponsibilities for a judicial district. This 
proposed amendment will elinii.nate:the obsolete term in favor of the current term for this 
office·.in connection,Withthea'~po¥frh~rit:ofapttb1ic,defen;der: ' 
0' ,.:;~",.>.,' ,;:.;,:,." '-";' .. i« ::~;:?"",.<.,:,' , 
"-',::,; 
S. Consider amending I.e. § S-S07Crelatingto forms for claiming exemptions from civil 
attachments and .garnishmentsi:,toClarifyand enumerate the exemptions to which a 
debtor may be entitled. 
. , .~ 
One of the exemptions described in the'presentexemptionforin under Idaho Code § 8-507C 
is ambiguous and has misledclaimants:irito claiming exemptions to which they are not entitled 
under the law; Itisrecomrnendedtha:ttheexemption form'setoutinthis statute be modified 
, ". '. ' .-
to describe withmoreparticularitY,the ,items that qualify for· exemption. 
9. Consider amendingIdaboCode.§32~717(A)relatingtoa noncustodial parent's access 
to a minor Child'srecord~,·bY~tQYt~itigthat.theminor,Cbild'saddress shall be deleted 
,.from arecord<itr'equesfe(Unwr!tiit~by.t4ercustodialpaient.' . 
"',' ".', 
The recommended amendment would prevent a noncustodial parent who has been a 
perpetrator of spousal abuse from learning the location of the other spouse simply by having 
access to the child's school or medicalrecords.·: . 
10. (A) Consider amending Idaho Code § 14623 \vhichcreates the State IS TARS technology 
fund to provide that interest earned llll-fund deposits shall be returned to the fund. 
Idaho Code § 67-1210, relating to the investment of idle money of the State provides that 
interest received on state monies shall be paid into the State general fund unless otherwise 
specifically provided by statute.~.Theproposed amendment to I.e. § 1-1623 will provide 
authority for interest .eamed on fUnd deposits to. be returned to the 1ST ARS fund. 
10;(B)Consideran1ehdirigldahoC6d~·31~320tA.reMtingtocourt fees to provide that the $5,00 
" ' " " .. ' .. ', ". ' ,'''., , .' -'" -" ".' ., . . , 
the 
tm"t'vi~ioln fees 

APPENDIX C 
Minutes 
SENATE JUDICIARY AND RULES COMMITTEE 
Jamiary 30, 1998 
1:38 p,m, 
Room 437 
Vice-Chairman Boatright, Bunderson, Risch, King, Deide, Riggs, and Dunklin 
Chairman Darrington and Senator Sorensen 
Senator King moved the minutes of Wednesday, January 28,1998, be approved as 
written, The motion was seconded by Senator Riggs and approved by voice vote, 
The following ten piecesofiegislatlon come from the Justices of the Supreme 
Court transmitted to the Governor In their annual "defects In the laws" report 
under Article 5, Section 25 of the Idaho Constitution, 
CRIMINAL SENTENCES 
Tom Frost, Legal Counsel, Idaho Supreme Court, introduced S 1300 which provides 
that a court may sentence a defendant to more than one period of retained jurisdiction in 
a case, 
Senator Diede moved that S 1300 be sent to the floor with a Do Pass 
recommendation. The motion was seconded by Senator King and approved by voice 
vote. . 
JUDGMENTS 
Tom Frost, Legal Counsel, Idaho Supreme Court, introduced S 1301 which deletes the 
reference to a judgment book. 
/ 
Senator Bunderson moved that S 1301 be sent to the floor with a Do Pass 
recommendation. The motion was seconded by Senator Riggs and approved by voice 
vote. 
JUVENILE CORRECTIONS ACT. 
Tom Frost, Legal Counsel, Idaho Supreme Court, introduced S 1302 which provides for 
the adjudication of offenses pertaining to the use or being under the influence of 
controlled substances under the Juvenile Corrections Act. 
Senator Dunklin moved that S 1302 be sent to the floor with a Do Pass 
recommendation. The motion was seconded by Senator Riggs and approved by voice 
vote. 
DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE 
Tom Frost, Legal Counsel, Idaho Supreme Court, introduced S 1303 which provides 
that it shall be unlawful for a person with an alcohol concentration of 0.04 or higher but 
less than 0.08 to drive a commercial vehicle. 
. MOTION: 
Senator Riggs moved that S .1303 be sent to the floor with a Do Pass 
recommendation. The motion was seconded by Senator Bunderson and approved by 
voice vote. 
JURY COMMISSIONERS 
Tom Frost, Legal Counsel, Idaho Supreme Court, introduced S 1304 which provides 
that a jury commissioner whose term has expired shall serve until a successor is 
appointed and qualifies. 
Senator. King movedjhat S1304 be sentto the floor with a Do Pass 
recommendation.· The motion was seconded by Senator Bunderson and approved by 
voice vote. 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
Tom Frost, Legal Counsel, Idaho Supreme Court, introduced S 1305 which clarifies the 
procedure for the'exarnlnation and proCessing citizen complaints and makes it 
consistent withcurrent IdahO Crimin!ill ~ules and case law covering the filing of criminal 
actions. 
Senator Riggs moved that S 1305 be sent to the floor with a Do Pass 
recommendation. The motion was seconded by Senator Dunklin and approved by 
voice vote. _. 
PUBLIC DEFENDE~S 
Tom Frost, Legal Counsel,ldaho.Supreme Court, introduced S 1306 which provides 
that the admlnistratlvl!l judge rather than senior Judge shall appoint the committee of 
lawyers who are todl!lslgnate the panel from which the public defender or juvenile public 
defender shall be chosen. . 
Senator King moved that S 1306 be sent to the floor with a Do Pass 
recommendation. The motion was seconded by Senator Deide and approved by 
voice vote. 
ATTACHMENTS AND GARNISHMENTS 
Tom Frost, Legal Counsel, Idaho Supreme Court, Introduced S 1307 which clarifies and 
enumerate the exemptions to which a debtor may be entitled. 
Senator Dunklin moved that S1307 be sent to the floor with a Do Pass 
recommendation. The motion was seconded by Senator Riggs and approved by 
voice vote. 
NONCUSTODIAL PARENTS ACCESS TO A CHILO'S RECORDS 
Tom Frost, Legal Counsel,ldahOSupreme Court, introduced S 1308 which provides 
that a minor child's address shall be deleted from the child's medical, dental, health, 
school or educational records upon the written request of the custodial parent. 
Senator Dunklin moved that S 1308 be held In Committee until an addendum is 
prepared and brought back before the Committee. The motion was seconded by 
Senator Deide and approved by voice vote. 
Senators Dunklin, Delde, and King to meet with Tom Frost to draft an addendum 
to S 1308. 
. SENATE JUDICIAY & RULES COMMITTEE 
Friday, January 30, 1998 --Agenda--Page 2 
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S 1301 
MOTION 
S 1302 
MOTION 
Match 9, 1998 
3:10 p,m. 
Room40a 
Minutes 
Represe~tativeCeha'Gould, ch~irman; Representative Paul Kjellander, Vice Chairman; 
Representatives Jones (9), Tippets, Sali, Field (13), Barrett, Bruneel, Hornbeck, Clark, 
Ellsw()rth, Judd, Jaquet,Boe .... " 
.,. ,.,:~.,<"- .. ' , , .: ':X-;>::'.' ::'.k<~,:::,:",t}_ c,':':;~'T\<,'~" . 
Representatives Kjeliander,Jones and Field 
t~i;,Frost, Atto~~y, Id~h6 Supreme Court ... 
It wasmovedbYR~p~~S~r\t~tIV~::B~rieElt() ~pprovejheminutesof the meeting held on 
March.5.! 1998,;a$ Wrlttiln~"M~Ii.qh, eaiTied." ;1:, ...... '.. . ..•. 
'. ",,, ',-,,' ":,.'-''':.,,-', ,,'. . 
,};:,~,,,,,, ", ''''::, ·,--:,,~,,~."t-':~"·"'~:';~~;,_-;i)'~'~~f~~,';r·."',~i\'-~" '''~',\' _ , -:: 
The Chair called the meetingio;prder and .said thefirsfitem of business regarded the 
child support bills. Those bills,Wili be heard on the floor tomorrow, March 10, 1998. Mr. 
Frost was then recognized to testify on S 1300. 
Mr •. Frost,sald the,biU$,beJqre,th.E!,Committee.areall ndefects in .the laws"bills and this first 
bilLclarifies that a court may sentence a defendant to more than One period of retained 
jurisdiction in.a case, thereby giving the judge added flexibility in fashioning an 
appropriate sentence.; .... 
Representative Boe m()vedto send S 130.0 to the floor with a Do Pass 
recommimdatioit:., Mot/oncarTIed. Representative Gould will carTy the bill on the floor:· ' ..... ' ....... '. ......:,:.:' ......• ..'. . 
. ". 
The next item on.the agenda wasS1301. 
Mr. Frost said this bill eliminates an obsoletil rilference to a judgment book which is no 
longer maintained; .' ','" """" . 
Representative Ellsworth moved to send S 1301 to the floor with a Do Pass 
recommendatiori. Motion carried. Representative Judd will carry the bill on the 
floor.,·' , ,.' :,:, >, 5«':"";;(,,.;/>,,/ ' 
The next item on the agenda was S 1302. 
This bill eliminates a conflict between a section of the criminal code and a section of the 
Juvenile Corrections Act. ;Itremovesthe language which provides that the Juvenile 
Corrections Act does not apply to the posseSSion of or being under the influence of 
controlled substan¢e so that these cases will be handled In the juvenile courts. 
Representative Jaquet moved to send S .1302 to the floor with a Do Pass· 
Sign-In Sheet HOUSE JUDICIARY, RULES &ADMINISTRATION . ". ..... . .......... ~ ....•..... > . 
" Date ...... '. k f:9G ', . 
. i Name, Address, & Phone 
PLEASE PRINT ' 
()C<:l\l'ation Representing" . ProlcQ~ 
:-Tntp.rpdM In 
-1309 
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moneys thuB COLlected,. together with other' ,revenues 
administered under- the direction of the board- of commissioners 
Idaho S!.tate BQar: for the purpose of adminis-tering." t;be Ida 
SQar, encouraging" local bar associations, promoting legal 
seminars, fostering relations between the public and the bar 
the' purpose of establishing and'maintaining 8" clients t securitV"'-£l 
which- shall be administered' by'the -, I-dabo. Sstate-· Bbar 
under 'rules approved by the S~upreme e£ou;t, provIded 
ents' security fund shall be funded by assessment of the 
the Idaho S.!tate' B,2ar-not to exceed 'ten dollars ($10.00). 
per-·-'year;,- independent ----of, 'the, license'-_ ,_',fee. All:, moneys received' 
expended ;', by, the'::-; commissioners ':' :o£',":.the Idaho": Sstate 
audited annually by a certified pu~lic accountant.'· 
Approved March 18";,, . .1998._ '.~' "'-' .. , 
:';";J; ~ "",,' : cr,:f,L.~' 
,,-,-,. 
i.-, 
CHAPTEIt.,6 I 
(S.B.,·No", 1300) 
:'< 
" ;'~;i ,-
'-':' ;.'/~-,:: ";':::-',- ";C,' __ ._'~_._, 
-- - l ', .... ', ~'~;_ 'C'_,',,: ~_; 
:'::<,,;~-::,~';._._ ""' ,'''' ,', ,.l'~~;~'~;~~i;:;';~::' : .. ~' -, ~~~;1~~ ~ ~' '; ',"': 
RELATING'TO CRIMlNAI,SENTENCING; ,AMENDING 'SEl 
·'.·TO ,PROVIDETI!AX A.COURT,MAY SEliTENCEA DE 
'" 'PERIOD OF, RETAINED, JURISDICTION;IN A CASE 
-:;:0-;' :~~" " ""<'-1 -',;; ;-:~-~~'6-~:~~;~' .;~" ,;"~;_",:-;_,~,:",, '>-" 
Be: LIt', Enacted- by ':t~ -'Legislatur.e :'_of -t~e .8tatt::' 
'",',. 
'i'_':;':'<'r 
SECTION .1. That':section ·i~i601;.Idaho ·C, 
hereb.y aplended to.- re.ad "as _,follows :".:-L, ", 
~:Li:-,:<:':r~-',~ c:-':' --''-''\i"/'-''-,·~:::~~,~·."" __ ,:,:,:,' .>""-~-_~~>~,-; ,-,;;--. 
,. 1!l-2601 •.. COMHllTATION;SUSPEN~ION., WITHHOLD 
BATioN'.'_~-Whenever any"persOIl': Srull:Ii '-have b~n' con' 
oE guiltY:j< "i~ -any',district_ court.:L~~:; ~_e :-state--oi 
crime::. -against c the,,-claws-·of-·,the:sta-te, except ~th 
der-,~,:the"court ,in "it1,i--discretion;,:may': . -'c_, ' • 
~ 
1 .. -_::,Commut;:e the ~~~~en,ce 'an~ -confin~: the, :d~;~~~ 
jail(_, or,':O if- the~""defendant is_ of-, pr,o-p_er, ag~_~.::,-i.n;:~~~ ~~, ... ~_".":,,,:~,' 
corrections center;, or" --,.;-"" <,~,-
2.. Suspend the execution ,of _the j'udgment :at, ,the -time 
or,-: _at',', ~ny: time _,~uring' the -term of,- a- sentence in_ the county 
place the defendant on probation under such 
deems_ Ilecessary and: _~pedient; or ;,"_::: .. 
,,' ,3 .. ' -- Withhold. ':judgment on __ suchot_erirts and:£or' such 'time p're~cribe . and. may p~ac~' th~" defendant:- on. prob~~1o.n; ,()r 
4 .. - Suspend the execution- of the -judgment_oat '_any t~me_ duru:~,g3 
first ,one hundretl- ~ighty (180) days_ of "a 's,eD._t_ence to the,' cust,ody( 
the',," state board" of ,:'correction .. "-The co~'rt 'shaii' __ rel:ain', Jur;'sd~ __ C~ 
over ~he_:- pr'isoner for' the first one_'hundr~d :ei~ty_ (180) days: .. :'~_rt; 
the_ 'prisoner is a juvenile, until the juvenile reaches twen~y-o~e--, 
years of age.- The prisoner will remain COmmitted to the board of 
~~ 
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affirmatively-i'placed on probation by .the court. :.-.Place-
shall be-, '.;under-: such -terms. and_:conditionp_~as _.,the 
~ expedIent.-. 
,no 
. of 
to ho1:-d'i,~ hearing,. of-_any,:_~nd wit~ t:'_es_pect· to 
the :court;~,:£or._~;the-, grant_,or·' denial-;, of -,:probation. 
':"'~a.!matter ,left-:·to:!~the_::,sound discretion· of ,the',;c:ourt~. _Any 
made:;-:by ~he -'depar~t-,to the:_court.:,_regarding::the_ pri,s-
:in-. the--.nature _,o~f.:an'~addendum ,to~, the,2presentence -;, ,report_ 
"correction and_;,i~s) agency,. the ,:department ·',of\'c~rr~ction, 
employees_-:,shall_, nC?t',;:l?e,,'l,1eld: financ~~llyp;responsible""for dam-
to 
'.i, 
the: ;,~court i~should, 'suspend _ ~ _. 
t\y;,co~ted- in'f,acc_~~ce ,w,ith;;;,1Subse:ction: ,l~: ·,of·-:,,·this 
)Ul!~~ :'if ;;.it: '- grants-~_\~~bation;, -{may,:iplace ,~the'_ de£end4nt ,_on 
'.%~~ii'~>,'-l',-?i'-'c- 'r, :~;:-;' '.'~";'-'"t';;,;;1i~i~ri::,tl-~:I',::~:,):' ~'-~_$~'\l:0:;'>.i ::-';i:L, -t'--;.:" ~ -J:~~"".tJc'~ 
riod_.Lo£ 'probation -' o_rder~ :_by ~:a::;:court ;~-under' this __ ~ section 
i~D:t,o_r:;:<plea~--ofx,~y,;"for' ,'a mi;,~demeanor ~_ : indictable,; "or 
\fo'be~:..:.'£or-;', a "peri0d7:~l' not 'mo~e:!:,than-":two ,;-e2l ':years.;, and 
;on,;or_:- plea .,', o;'~guilt.y,: for:-" a £elony~,the_ ,period ,:o£,,,~proba~ 
a,,-period, of _not,' DiO're',:-than the~~irpum_ period';':fo-ru,which 
~t,;have beeri .. imprisoned-. . , , 
.. <c-,;:,' i" ';'-~-"!' 
c 18",.1998. 
,--, 
" 
',ClIAP'IER 68 
(S.B. No. 1301) 
:,,',.. ·AN ACT 
to,:,.JlJDGIfENTS; AMENDING SECTION 10-1110, IDAHO CODE, TO DELETE 
,IlOLETE>REFERENCE 'TOA . JUIlGIIENT BOOK, 
,. 
Legislature of the State of Idaho: 
Section 10-1110, Id'aho Code, be, and the same is 
read as follows: 
TRANSCRIPT OF JUIlGIIENTS -- LIEN ACQUIRED. A tran-
of any judgment or decree of any court of this 
